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It may be a serious burden for the US that social justice in that country, which
is the main subject of today’s discussion, is not only a domestic issue, but also a
global concern. It is always a matter of concern for the world outside the US
whether migrants from these countries who are living in the US are well treated or
not. At the same time the US is expected to treat Asian and African countries
with justice in international relations. But the justice that non-American people
refer to in respect to the US is different from the social justice that Americans
discuss. American nationals are concerned about social justice and equality
among the citizens of various ethnic, religious, and social origins in the US; on
the other hand the non-Americans outside of the US care about US policy toward
the non-Western world. It is true that the Arab public blames the US for the lack
of justice in the behavior of US soldiers at Abu Ghraib or Samarra during the
occupation of Iraq; but their main concern is not a matter of violations of human
rights by individual Americans, but the political mistakes and failures that harm
the Arab population. This does not mean that the people of the Middle East
accept the US occupation in a gentle and humanitarian manner, and they criticize
US policy itself no matter whether US soldiers have respect for the social justice
of Iraqi detainees or not. The US makes conscious efforts to maintain social
justice because this encourages US nationals to be good Americans; but US
citizens do not necessarily care about maintaining political justice in US
diplomatic policy, which is what the non-US Arabs and Muslims citizens care
most about.
As I am not a scholar of American studies but of the Middle East, the region
in the world where people talk most frequently about the “injustices” of the US, it
is beyond my ability to give any academic comment on the presented papers.
Instead, I would like to present my views on the reasons why the US as a state is
understood as unjust in its policy toward the Middle East.
It is widely believed that 9/11 and the US “war on terror” aggravated anti-US
sentiments among people in the Middle East and other Muslim societies, who
criticize the prejudice and racism against Muslims in the West after 9/11. The
question is, however, whether the perception of Middle Eastern societies
concerning the lack of “justice” in US policy started only after 9/11. Rather, the
US has been accused of being “unjust” toward the Arabs and Muslims throughout
the last half century.
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In this comment, I would like to explain the reasons why the US has been
considered “unjust” toward the Arab and Muslim countries. What I call the
“injustice” of the US here is often described as a policy “double standard.” That
is, the US uses a different gauge by which to judge Arab and Muslim societies in
its diplomacy.
It is in regard to the Palestinian issue that the US policy “double standard” is
most frequently cited. Needless to say, the US support for Israel is the main
cause of anti-American feelings among Arabs and Muslims. In the wake of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein, the president of Iraq at the
time, was widely supported and praised when he raised the issue of the Israeli
occupation of Palestine as being parallel to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, saying
that Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from all the territory of
Palestine.” Arab incumbent elites insist that it is a great deceit for the US to use
military pressure to force Arab governments to follow international law despite
the fact that it never forces Israel to implement UN resolutions.
Public opinion in Arab and Muslim societies has seen the US in a harsh light
for using different standards when dealing with Israel and with Arabs throughout
the period from the 60s to the present. Israel is always understood as being
democratic despite its aggressive military policy towards its neighbors, but the
Arab states are always understood as being ruled by dictators, radicalists or
fundamentalists, even when they are democratically elected with the people’s
support (such as Algeria in 1991, Palestine in 2006, and Iran after 1979).
After the late 1970s and especially after 9/11, this double standard can be
seen to have been employed along religious lines; between Muslims and
Christians. The US attitude toward Hamas and Hizb Allah in Lebanon is an
example of this type of “double standard.” Although Hamas won a majority of
votes in the election for the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006 and formed a
cabinet consisting of party members in accordance with the law and the
democratic process, the US and international society cut off their support for the
Palestinian Authority, and supported the PLO, the loser in the election, as a
counterpart for the peace negotiations. In Lebanon, the US administration as well
as the Western media, consider Hizb Allah to be a terrorist organization,
neglecting to recall that it is a legal political party that occupies about 20% of the
seats in the parliament.
In other words, US “injustice” was understood as a product of differences in
national ideology in the 1960s; Arab nationalism vs. American liberalism, anti-
colonialism vs. imperialism, socialist policy vs. US capitalism. On the other hand
US “injustice” since the late 70s has been recognized as being based on
differences in religion and belief, matters which deny the possibility of political
negotiation.
The second “injustice” that the people of the Middle East point to is the
inconsistency of US policy toward its alliance partners in the Middle East. In
1979, the Carter administration declined to make all-out efforts to save its long-
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term pro-US ally, the Shah of Iran, in the Islamic revolution. Iraq was a close
friend of the US during the last years of the Iran-Iraq war, but it is the same US
that brought an end to the Iraqi regime in 2003. It was none other than former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who shook hands with Saddam Hussein in
1983, when the US was preparing to resume diplomatic relations with Iraq. Iraq
was at the time considered to be “the country with the most Western value system
and technology among all the Middle Eastern countries except Israel” (Wall Street
Journal, May 1980), and was therefore a possible counterpart of the US in
securing the West’s interests in the Persian Gulf. Saddam was a useful partner
against the Islamist regime in Iran, which was hostile to the US during the 1980s.
Osama Bin Laden was another example of a person who worked for US
interests against the US enemy, that is, the Soviet occupation forces in
Afghanistan in the 1980s. Both Saddam and Bin Laden were supported and
strengthened under the US security strategy during the Cold War, then lost their
importance as political assets for the US when the Cold War came to a close.
Fred Halliday [2001] rightly points out that the problems now in the 21
st
century
are caused by two dustbins remaining over from the Cold War: one is the
unofficial exports of technology or the materials for WMDs, mainly from the
Soviet Union. The other is the “gangs” that the US employed to fight its proxy
wars, such as dictators in Africa, Saddam against Iran, and also Islamist gangs
who were encouraged to fight against the Soviet Army, recruited by Saudi Arabia
and trained by the Pakistani Army. Rashid Khalidi also emphasizes the impact
the Cold War system had in distorting the relations between the US and the
Arab/Muslim countries in the Middle East [Khalidi 2009].
Inconsistency in US policy appears especially obvious toward Islamist
regimes. As I noted above, the US attitude toward the Islamists has been negative
since the Islamist Revolution took place in Iran in 1979, and the US does not
admit the possibility of democracy under Islamist regimes, no matter whether
such regimes have electoral systems, parliaments, or multi-party systems or not.
But this does not mean that the US is always hostile to Islamist regimes in the
Middle East. This reveals another inconsistency of US policy toward Muslim
countries. The Islamists, like the current Iranian political elites, came to dominate
the Iraqi regime based on the result of the 2005 election, which the US claimed
was a “liberation” and a “democratization” of Iraq achieved by the Iraqi War.
Actually there is no great difference in political stance between Khamenei in Iran
and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in the ISCI of Iraq, the latter having perhaps a rather
more militant tendency. US support for Saudi Arabia has been taken for granted
for more than half a century, although it has been an “undemocratic” Islamist
Sunni monarchy similar to the Taliban of Afghanistan.
When people say “the US is not just” in the Middle East, it mainly means that
US policy is not just and fair, and it does not mean that the nature of American
society is to be unjust toward Arabs and Muslims. Popular opinion in the Middle
East sees the problem as a political issue that has caused friction between the US
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and the Arabs/Muslims. On the other hand, however, the US view on the Middle
East is deeply influenced by Orientalist ideas, or the Christian concern for the
biblical sites in the Near East, according to McAlister [2001] and Little [2002].
Prejudice against the Arabs in Hollywood and in National Geographic magazine
has been often seen since WWI. This image of the “Bad Arab” has become
prevalent among Americans especially after 9/11 [Shaheen 2001], when
emotional and religious rhetoric started to be used to denounce Arab/Muslim
society, both inside and outside the US. In responding to the religious terms used
by the Bush administration toward the “terrorists,” such as “Crusaders” and
“Islamic Fascists,” Arabs and Muslims started to criticize the US not only with
respect to policy but also its “injustice” toward their religion. Religious and
sectarian discourse has been introduced into politics in the Middle East, and this
has encouraged a dichotomous framework of conflict based on religion in the
disputes that used to be dealt with as purely political issues.
If the contention between the US and the Arab and Muslim societies in the
Middle East were only caused by an Orientalist bias concerning the Middle East
on the part of the Americans, it could be solved through achieving social justice in
domestic society, sowing a sense of respect and equality with Arabs and Muslims
among US citizens, which would then influence policymakers. The question is
how the US concern for minority communities can be reflected in US foreign
policy. There are some minority groups in the US that represent the interest of
their countries of origin. In that case, achieving full rights for ethnic minorities in
the US can contribute to changing US diplomatic policy toward the same ethnic
groups outside the US. A typical example is the case of Israel and the Israel
Lobby in the US. Jewish communities reflect Israeli policy and try to influence
US policy in favor of Israel.
On the contrary, the Arab and Muslim migrant communities in the US are less
positive in putting pressure on US policymaking. In the wake of 9/11, the Arab
American organization asked one member of the royal family of Saudi Arabia to
make more efforts to lobby for the Arab and Muslim communities in the US; the
answer was no, and the Saudi monarchy expressed a negative stance toward
interference in domestic US politics.
One of the reasons for the indifference of the Arab countries to increase
pressure on the US through their communities in that country is that the number
of Arab migrants is limited due to a shorter history of immigration. Arabs began
immigrating to the US as early as 1890, but the majority were Christians mainly
from Lebanon and Syria, or Assyrians and Armenians from Ottoman territories
[Maclister 2001]. The majority of migrants from the Middle East migrated to
Europe, and established large minority communities in France (from North
Africa), in Britain (from Iraq and other Gulf countries, as well as from Pakistan),
and in Germany (from Turkey). The number of immigrants to the US from the
Middle East has been relatively small, and most of them are concentrated in
Detroit or other regional cities, not in the policymaking centers.
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The low numbers of people and the weakness of the network among the
migrant community from the Middle East stand in stark contrast to those of
Jewish Americans. But a greater difference with the Jewish community is the
contradiction between the political purposes of the Arab and Muslim immigrant
communities and those of their countries of origin. Some minorities of Middle
East origin are active in lobbying US policymakers, but they generally do so not
in favor of their countries of origin but rather against them. This is because the
immigrants have come to the US mainly as political refugees or to flee from the
control of existing regimes; Iranians after the Revolution in 1979, and Afghanis
after the invasion of the USSR or after the emergence of the Taliban. Though
small in number, Iraqis also acted as a political opposition against the existing
regime, and attempted to encourage the US to overthrow the regime of Saddam
Hussein.
When the US administration plans diplomatic policy concerning Middle
Eastern countries, it often relies on information and reactions from the immigrant
community. A typical case can be seen in the US administration decision to
launch the military attack against Iraq. The Bush administration relied on several
Iraqi expatriates living in the US, notably Kanan Makkiya and Ahmad Chalabi,
for the strategic information required for the War. It is now recognized with
regret that the misinformation that they supplied to the policymakers was the
major reason for the failure of post-war rehabilitation in Iraq. The same can be
said for Iranians in the US. Iranians living in the US are, in general, opposed to
the Islamist regime in Iran and their views on the current Iranian regime is
reflected in US policy toward Iran. This might reduce the necessity for the US
administration to have direct contact with the Iranian government in
policymaking.
If they neglect the demands of these pro-US expatriates, however, the US
administration will be easily criticized for being “unfair” to them. In 1996, a
number of Kurdish CIA collaborators in North Iraq fled from Iraq after being
attacked by Saddam Hussein’s Army. They were kept on Guam Island, as the US
administration was reluctant to offer them the right to live on the mainland. This
measure resulted in the collaborators harboring a bad impression of the US, which
was criticized as not being “humanitarian.” The same applies to Iraqis who failed
in toppling the Iraqi regime and ended as refugees in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf
War. They expressed their support for US involvement in the fight inside Iraqi
territory, encouraged by the US troops in Kuwait, and rose in revolt against the
Iraqi regime. They then fled to the Saudi desert when they saw that the US would
not support their uprising. Some were allowed to move to the US as political
refuges, but many remained in Saudi Arabia for a long time in quite inhumane
circumstances.
If the Americans respect social justice toward citizens from the Middle East
who have expressed loyalty to the US, no matter whether they are American
citizens or collaborators for US policy, the US administration might be
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encouraged to respond to their demands to take military action against their
country of origin, and this might be seen as an “unjust” policy toward Arab and
Muslim countries in the Middle East.
This is not only a dilemma between the promotion of social justice in the
“undemocratic” countries of the Middle East and the pursuit of political justice in
US diplomatic policy in the Middle East, but also a dilemma between the pursuit
of social justice toward expatriate communities in the US and its policy on the
Middle East.
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